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SHADOW BANKING, FINANCIAL MARKETS, AND THE REAL 
ESTATE SECTOR* 
 
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ** 
 
I.  Overview of Shadow Banking 
 
 A. Introduction  
 
The world’s financial system has been rapidly changing. A 
central feature of this change is disintermediation, which entails the 
removal of banks as financial intermediaries. The term “shadow 
banking” is often used as shorthand to refer to the disintermediated 
financial system. The “shadow banking system” consists of 
effectively all forms of financing that are not bank intermediated. 
 
  1. Examples 
 
Shadow banking encompasses structured finance and 
securitization, in which financing is indirectly raised by special-
purpose entities (“SPEs”). It also includes financing and financial 
services provided by other non-bank financial intermediaries—such 
as finance companies, hedge funds, money-market mutual funds, real 
estate investment trusts (“REITs”),1 securities lenders engaging in 




* Adapted from a “Firestarter” talk—prepared for the World Economic 
Forum’s annual Industry Partnership Strategists Meeting (held on October 
3, 2012)—on transformation of the real estate sector in light of ongoing 
shifts in the financial markets and broader global trends. 
** Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School of 
Law, and Founding Director, Duke Global Capital Markets Center; 
schwarcz@law.duke.edu. I thank the following professionals for helpful 
comments: Jason Kravitt and Stuart Litwin of Mayer Brown LLP; Eric 
Marcus and Warren Bernstein of Kaye Scholer LLP; and Eugene Pinover of 
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP. 
1 Although REITs have long preceded what is generally referred to as 
shadow banking, I include them because they are, technically, SPEs that 
issue securities and use the proceeds to invest in real estate properties. 
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  2. Impact  
 
The amount of non-bank intermediated (i.e., 
disintermediated) credit already “rivals” the amount of bank-
intermediated credit provided to households and businesses.2 The 
trajectory of disintermediation suggests that disintermediated credit 
will soon, if it does not already, exceed bank-intermediated credit. 
The gross amount of disintermediated credit was estimated to be 
nearly $20 trillion in March 2008,3 but is thought to have grown to at 
least three times that level—between $60 and $67 trillion—in 2011.4  
 
  3. Risks and Regulation 
 
The paramount concern posed by the disintermediated 
financial system is that it can, if left unregulated, pose systemic risks 
to the entire financial system.5 Disintermediation makes it much 
more likely, for example, that market participants will engage in 
profitable but risky transactions even though doing so could 
externalize harm—including systemic harm—onto other market 
participants and even ordinary citizens.6 Notwithstanding such risks, 
                                                            
2 Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff 
Report No. 458, 2010), available at http://newyorkfed.org/research/ 
staff_reports/sr458.html (“The shadow banking system rivals the traditional 
banking system in the intermediation of credit to households and 
businesses.”). 
3 Id. at 4. 
4 Compare Philip Halstrick, Tighter Bank Rules Give Fillip to Shadow 
Banks, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2011, 4:17 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/20/uk-regulation-shadow-banking-
idUSLNE7BJ00T20111220 (indicating that the shadow banking sector was, 
at that time, a $60 trillion industry), with FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL 
SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT (2012), available at 
www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121118c.pdf (estimating 
shadow banking’s worldwide assets in 2011 at $67 trillion). 
5 See, e.g., Klára Bakk-Simon et al., Shadow Banking in the Euro Area: An 
Overview 4 (European Cent. Bank, Occasional Paper No. 133, 2012), 
available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp133.pdf 
(observing that disintermediation is “one of the main sources of financial 
stability concerns”). 
6 See infra Part IV.C (discussing responsibility failure). See generally 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 206 (2008). 
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however, disintermediation can increase financial efficiency.7 The 
challenge will be to determine how shadow banking should be 
regulated to try to maximize its efficiencies while minimizing its 
risks.8 
 
B. How will Shadow Banking Impact the Real 
Estate Sector? 
 
 Securitization, hedge funds, and REITs are especially 
relevant to the real estate sector. 
 
 1. Because securitization is a critical means of enabling 
mortgage-loan originators to regain liquidity to make new loans 
(which I will discuss as a means of “funding regeneration”9), it is 
important both to the housing recovery and to commercial real estate 
generally. A common political response to the recent financial crisis, 
however, has been to restrict securitization.10 
 
 2. Hedge funds are becoming increasingly important 
originators of mortgage loans, as I will discuss.11 
 
 3. REITs might also be regarded as part of the shadow 
banking system.12 Although their use has long been concentrated in 
U.S. markets, they are becoming increasingly important in global 
                                                            
7 Steven L. Schwarcz, Inaugural Address: Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619, 624–25 (2012) (explaining why shadow 
banking “may well constitute a public good by helping to achieve 
efficiencies”). 
8 Id. at 641.(“Due to regulatory arbitrage and the increasing technological 
ability of non-banks to compete with traditional banks in providing financial 
products and services, shadow banking seems here to stay. I therefore have 
focused on how shadow banking should be regulated to try to maximize its 
efficiencies while minimizing its risks.”). 
9 See infra Part III. 
10 Steven L. Schwarcz, The 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture, 
Protecting Investors in Securitization Transactions: Does Dodd-Frank 
Help, or Hurt?, 72 LA. L. REV. 591, 593 & 596 (2012). 
11 See infra Part II.A.2. 
12 See supra note 1. 
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real estate finance.13 However, REITs are not significant real estate 
loan originators or funding regenerators.14 
  
II. Funding Origination 
 
A. Mortgage-Loan Origination 
  
1. Bank Origination 
 
Banks are currently observing very conservative real estate 
lending standards.15 Regulation such as Basel III may well motivate 
banks to continue observing conservative real estate lending 
standards.16 
 
2. Non-Bank Origination 
 
When banks observe conservative lending standards—either 
voluntarily or pursuant to regulation that applies only to banks—non-
banks have an opportunity to begin competing in real estate loan 
origination. For example, I have been informed that hedge funds, 
both directly and through vehicles (such as SPEs) that issue 
securities to raise financing, are now originating a significant amount 
of commercial real estate lending in the United States. I also 
understand that hedge funds are actively engaged in acquiring 
residential mortgage-origination and servicing businesses, which 




13 Julius L. Sokol, The Proliferation of Global REITS and the Cross-
Borderization of the Asian Market, 9 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 481, 487–88 
(2008). 
14 Robert H. Bergdolt & Robert J. Le Duc, Public Nontraded Mortgage 
REITs—Issues and Opportunities, 7 J. TAX’N & FIN. PRODUCTS 47, 48 
(2008). 
15 The Monitor, Bank Regulation, 30 NO. 8 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES 
POL’Y REP. 22, 25 (2011) (discussing the ease with which banks will 
comply with Basel III because of their current risk-averse practices). 
16 See id. 
17 E-mail from Stuart Litwin, Partner, Mayer Brown LLP, to the author 
(Sept. 6, 2012) (on file with author). 
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3. Government Roles in Mortgage-Loan 
Origination 
  
 (i) Governments worldwide are increasingly considering 
restricting residential mortgage-loan origination standards.18 Overly 
restrictive origination standards could, of course, impede the housing 
recovery.  
 
 (ii) In the United States, for example, mortgage lending will 
be strongly driven by what is known as the Qualified Mortgage 
(“QM”) definition for making mortgage loans. This definitional 
limitation is mandated by § 1411 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which 
amends the Truth in Lending Act to prohibit a lender from making a 
residential mortgage loan unless the lender “makes a reasonable and 
good faith determination . . . that the consumer has a reasonable 
ability to repay the loan . . . .”19 
Until the definition is finalized, parties cannot estimate credit 
cost or availability. This contributes to the conundrum that, although 
today’s low interest rates and home prices should make housing very 
                                                            
18 See, e.g., CRAIG ALEXANDER, DEREK BURLETON, & DIANA PETRAMALA, 
TIGHTER MORTGAGE RULES TO COOL DEBT GROWTH, BUT HIGHER RATES 
ULTIMATELY REQUIRED (2012), available at 
http://www.td.com/document/PDF/economics/special/dp0912_mortgage_ru
les.pdf (discussing the tightening mortgage lending standards in Canada). 
19 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 
1411(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. 1639c(a)(1) (Supp. V 2011) (emphasis added) (“In 
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Bureau, no creditor may 
make a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a reasonable and 
good faith determination based on verified and documented information 
that, at the time the loan is consummated, the consumer has a reasonable 
ability to repay the loan, according to its terms, and all applicable taxes, 
insurance (including mortgage guarantee insurance), and assessments.”). In 
April 2011, the Federal Reserve Board delegated its issuance authority to its 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which issued a proposed 
rule amending Regulation Z. Under that proposal, a QM loan would require 
that several specific underwriting factors be considered and verified. See 
Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., 2011 Banking and Consumer Regulatory 
Policy (Apr. 19, 2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/bcreg/20110419a.htm (“The Federal Reserve Board on 
Tuesday requested public comment on a proposed rule under Regulation Z 
that would require creditors to determine a consumer's ability to repay a 
mortgage before making the loan and would establish minimum mortgage 
underwriting standards.”). 
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affordable, many ordinary families cannot qualify for mortgage 
loans.20 Furthermore, the final QM definition will strongly impact the 
availability and cost of credit because borrowers will have strong 
incentives to litigate mortgage loans that, in retrospect, arguably fall 
outside that definition. Under proposed law, for example, an ability-
to-repay violation would be a defense against foreclosure; also, a 
lender losing an ability-to-repay lawsuit would become subject to 
“enhanced damages,” which include liability for actual damages, 
double finance charges, and all costs.21 Attempts to finalize the QM 
definition thus face an inherent tension between protecting borrowers 
and ensuring reasonable credit availability. 
 One way to help resolve this tension would be to allow a 
definitional alternative option for a QM loan, based on the loan-to-
value ratio. For example, there could be a non-exclusive regulatory 
safe harbor if the collateral value is at least 1.X times the loan 
principal (where X equals an integer). This would be somewhat 
analogous to Regulation U of the Federal Reserve, which requires 
margin loans secured by margin stock to be collateralized at least 
2:1.22 I am not suggesting, however, that real estate loans need as 
much overcollateralization as margin loans. I understand that 
residential mortgage loans in Canada, for example, are keyed to only 
an 80% maximum loan-to-value ratio.23 
 
 (iii) The Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) 
may be considering taking further action to proactively regulate 
                                                            
20 Robert Hardaway, The Great American Housing Bubble: Re-examining 
Cause and Effect, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 33, 50 (2009) (noting that one-
third of Americans cannot afford to purchase a home). 
21 Regulation Z; Truth in Lending, 76 Fed. Reg. 91, 27391, 91, 27396 
(proposed May 11, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 226). 
22 See 12 C.F.R. § 221.7(a) (2012) (“The maximum loan value of any 
margin stock is fifty per cent of its current market value. “) It is only 
somewhat analogous because, unlike Regulation U, the definitional 
alternative option for a QM loan would be non-exclusive. 
23 Canadian Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 46, s. 418(1) (Can.) (“A bank shall not 
make a loan in Canada on the security of residential property in Canada for 
the purpose of purchasing, renovating or improving that property, or 
refinance such a loan, if the amount of the loan, together with the amount 
then outstanding of any mortgage having an equal or prior claim against the 
property, would exceed 80 per cent of the value of the property at the time 
of the loan.”). 
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mortgage origination in the United States.24 Also, I understand that 
there are worldwide regulatory efforts to impose restrictions and 
safety nets for mortgage loans. 
 
 (iv) Government may play other roles in mortgage 
origination—subject to the caveat that any government action would, 
of course, affect private market incentives. Should governments 
consider, for example, providing mortgage-loan guarantees, perhaps 
for the early years of a mortgage, much as they do for project 
financing during the risky construction phase? Should governments 
consider making credit available to mortgage-loan originators to 
enhance the liquidity of key real estate markets?25  
 
 (v) Also, given the very long-term nature of typical mortgage 
loans, what will be the impact of Basel III’s aversion to short-term 
“wholesale” funding to finance loan/asset books?26 Will mortgage 
loans be made for shorter periods? I understand that shorter term 
mortgage lending is already becoming common in some countries. 
Although shorter terms could help to mitigate lending risk, it could 
increase the burden on borrowers.  
 
                                                            
24 See Helen Mason, No One Saw It Coming —Again Systemic Risk and 
State Foreclosure Proceedings: Why a National Uniform Foreclosure Law 
is Necessary, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 41, 73–74 (2012) (noting that the FDIC 
has asked the Financial Stability Oversight Council to examine the risks 
posed by mortgage servicing and foreclosure). 
25 In that regard, compare the role of Federal Home Loan Banks in the 
United States. See Adam B. Ashcraft et al., The Federal Home Loan Bank 
System: The Lender of Next-to-Last Resort? 2-3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of 
N.Y., Staff Report No. 357, 2008), available at http://newyorkfed.org/ 
research/staff_reports/sr357.html.   
26 See Francisco Vazquez & Pablo Federico, Bank Funding Structures and 
Risk: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis 5, 16 (Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper No. 12/29, 2012), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp1229.pdf (concluding that 
Basel III addressed their findings, which included bank overreliance on 
wholesale funding before the economic crisis).  
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B. Alternatives to Mortgage Loans 
 
1. Alternative Forms of Access 
 
To what extent will restricted loan origination motivate 
alternative forms of “access”—such as leasing and other non-
ownership rights—to use real property? Leasing is important in some 
non-U.S. markets.27 Since the financial crisis, the leasing of 
residential real estate has become increasingly important in the U.S.28 
 
2. Rental Payments as Financial Assets 
 
As alternative forms of access grow, one can envision 
regenerating funding through securitization.29 Lease rental payments, 
for example, are “financial assets,” and at least theoretically all types 
of financial assets can be securitized. 
 




 Recall that, because securitization is a critical means of 
enabling mortgage-loan originators to regain liquidity to make new 
loans, it is important to both the housing recovery and commercial 
real estate generally. For example, a mortgage-loan originator that 
makes mortgage loans totaling $X can securitize the loans and regain 
close to $X of liquidity to make additional loans. These additional 
loans can likewise be securitized, enabling the mortgage-loan 
originator to make further additional loans. This cycle can continue, 
perhaps enabling a mortgage-loan originator starting with $X to 
make, for example, loans aggregating close to three or four times that 
amount per year. 
 
                                                            
27 Thomas J. Sugrue, The New American Dream: Renting, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 15, 2009, at W1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052970204409904574350432677038184.html (noting that in 
Germany, France, and Switzerland, renting is more common than buying). 
28 Id. 
29 See infra Part III.A. 
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1. GSE Securitization 
 
Government-sponsored enterprise (“GSE”) securitization is, 
through the monetization of mortgage loans, currently the primary 
domestic source of funding regeneration.30 This is partially driven by 
regulation. The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, imposes a 5% 
minimum unhedged risk-retention (“skin in the game”) requirement 
for non-GSE mortgage-loan securitizations.31 In this way, GSE 
securitization is inconsistent with the goal of the Obama 
administration’s white paper on housing finance, which contemplates 
phasing out the GSEs and enticing more “private capital” into the 
system.32 
 To some extent, however, GSE securitization reflects a post-
financial crisis move to safety.33 As discussed below, however, there 
may be a trend in today’s financial markets toward increasing 
tolerance for risk.34 
 
                                                            
30 Sec. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Comments on “FHA-Rural Regulatory 
Improvement Act of 2011” (May 24, 2011), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/052511sifma.pdf 
(indicating that GSEs are the largest issuers of mortgage-backed securities). 
31 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §941(b), 
15 U.S.C. 78o-11(c)(1)(i)(B) (Supp. V 2011). Risk Retention ties into the 
Qualified Residential Mortgage (“QRM”) rule because the risk-retention 
requirement does not apply to securitizing QRMs. Six federal agencies are 
jointly responsible for issuing this rule. QRMs are to be a higher quality 
subset of Qualified Mortgage (QM) loans. On March 11, 2011, the six 
agencies proposed a very tight QRM definition. There has been no 
subsequent release as to when a final rule will be issued. 
32 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, REFORMING AMERICA’S HOUSING MARKET: A 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 1–2 (2011) (outlining the Obama administration’s 
positions on housing finance). 
33 Thus, Ginnie Mae, which is wholly-owned by the U.S. government, has 
grown even more important as compared to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
Foreign investors often prefer Ginnie Mae securities because they are 
backed by a full U.S. government guarantee. Even though the yields on 
Ginnie Mae securities are lower than on Fannie and Freddie securities, 
investors are concerned about Fannie and Freddie because they are private 
entities (albeit “federally chartered” or “government sponsored”), having 
only a line of credit to the U.S. Treasury. 
34 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
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2. Non-GSE Securitization  
 
It is hard to predict the future of the residential mortgage-
backed securities (“RMBS”) market. However, until that market is 
weaned from the GSEs, the level of residential real estate financing 
may be limited. 
 
B. Covered Bonds 
 
 1. The use of covered bonds, like securitization, can also 
serve as a way to monetize mortgage loans.35 Some covered bond 
regimes are statutory and some are contractual. Statutory regimes are 
generally safer for investors because they provide legislative safe 
harbors. The United States does not yet have a statutory covered 
bond law.  
 
 2. The relationships and differences between securitization 
and covered bond transactions are complex. Although investors 
sometimes view covered bonds as preferable to securitization, 
covered bond transactions are more likely than securitization 
transactions to harm unsecured creditors of mortgage-loan 
originators.36 
 
IV. Controlling Future Real Estate Financing Risk 
 
 No matter how funding origination and funding regeneration 
are regulated, there are likely to be future financial failures. This is 
because shadow banking can trigger three types of market failures: 
information failure, agency failure, and responsibility failure (the last 
of which is often addressed as “externalities”). Regulation cannot 
completely address these three types of market failure. 
 
                                                            
35 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Conundrum of Covered Bonds, 66 
BUS. LAW. 561 (2011) (discussing covered bonds in connection with 
mortgage securitization). 
36 See id. at 586. 
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A. Information Failure  
 
1. Asymmetric Information 
 
By increasing complexity, shadow banking can cause 
information failure by making financial transactions and products 
more difficult to disclose and understand. In the recent financial 
crisis, for example, it appears that neither investors nor underwriters 
always fully understood and appreciated the potential consequences 
of complex, highly-leveraged ABS CDO securities, which were 
largely payable from securities that themselves were payable from 
underlying mortgage loans.37 
 
2. Bounded Rationality  
 
Although sometimes categorized separately, this can be 
viewed as a subset of information failure. 
 
 (i) We have difficulty, for example, appreciating unlikely 
events that, if they occur, could have devastating consequences.38 In 
this context, note the parallel between subprime margin loans as a 
causal factor in the Great Depression (when the rising stock market 
collapsed, many of these loans became undercollateralized),39 and 
subprime mortgage loans as a causal factor in the recent financial 
crisis (when the rising housing market collapsed, many of these loans 
likewise became undercollateralized).40 In both cases, observers 
critically under-appreciated the systemic consequences of a 
precipitous drop—unprecedented in then-recent history—in 
collateral value.41 
                                                            
37 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 
241–42 (2009). 
38 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: 
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1366-68 
(2011) (“Optimism bias and availability bias play a role in explaining why 
individuals systematically underestimate the likelihood of very rare but 
potentially devastating risks—a phenomenon known as ‘disaster myopia.’ 
People are unrealistically optimistic when thinking about extreme events 
with which they have no recent experience, and they may undervalue the 
importance of those events.”). 
39 Id. at 1356–57. 
40 Id. at 1360. 
41 Id. at 1357 & 1360. 
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 (ii) We also have short memories. Although in late 2008 and 
early 2009 no investor would buy anything that did not have a 
government guarantee, there is a trend in today’s financial markets 
toward increasing tolerance for risk. To obtain higher returns, 
investors—especially hedge funds—are now buying AAA/Aaa 
subprime auto and A-rated prime auto paper and are looking at other 
asset classes. We now appear to have a vibrant collateralized loan 
obligation market for non-mortgage asset classes (which looks in all 
respects like the old collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) market, 
albeit with a different name).42 Even the market for commercial 
mortgage-backed securities is improving, although the market for 
RMBS is still uncertain.43 
 Short memories, however, may not fully explain risk cycles 
and today’s market’s increasing tolerance for risk. This trend may 
also be explained as evidence of a swing back to normalcy from the 
earlier overreaction or as a result of competitive investors fighting to 
get high returns.44 
 
B. Agency Failure 
 
 1. By increasing complexity, shadow banking can increase 
the potential for agency failure (meaning principal-agent failure, as 
opposed to GSE “agency” failure). 
 
 2. The biggest problem may not be the traditional agency 
conflict between a firm’s owners and senior managers but, instead, 
the conflict between a firm’s senior managers and its secondary 
managers (such as vice presidents and analysts).45 Because secondary 
managers are typically paid on a short-term basis, including through 
yearly bonuses, and often move from firm to firm, their interests do 
                                                            
42 E-mail from Litwin, supra note 17. 
43 Id. 
44 Litwin also observes that governments worldwide have made it an 
economic policy to keep interest rates low to stimulate their economies and 
economic troubles have dramatically increased the demand for low-risk 
government securities. Short-term, AAA/Aaa-rated, asset-backed securities 
have a somewhat greater return than—and have become a reasonable 
substitute for—other low risk investments. Id.  
45 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The 
Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457 
(2009) (detailing conflicts of interest between firms and secondary 
managers). 
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not necessarily align with the long-term interests of their firms. Even 
more apropos to shadow banking, secondary managers may well 
have a better technical understanding of complex investments and 
transactions, so they can—and in the recent financial crisis, often 
likely did—recommend investments and transactions that generate 
high returns, and thus high bonuses to them, even though the 
investments and transactions pose real long-term risks to their 
firms.46 
 
 3. Agency failure is, theoretically, one of the easiest types of 
failure to try to manage by regulation.47 But to the extent managers 
can move to jobs in different countries, effective regulation will 
require international governmental cooperation. 
 
C. Responsibility Failure 
 
 1. Shadow banking also makes it much more likely that 
market participants will engage in profitable but risky transactions, 
although doing so could externalize harm—including systemic 
harm—onto other market participants and even ordinary citizens. 
Economists would see this as fitting into the traditional market-
failure category of “externalities.” 
 
 2. “Externalities,” however, is a counterintuitive and 
confusing term for a market-failure category because it conflates 
cause and effect. Externalities are consequences, not causes, of 
market failure. We need to focus more on the cause of those 
externalities, which I will call responsibility failure.48 
 
 3. For example, limited liability is an important source of 
responsibility failure that can lead to externalities. Because investors 
in firms are not personally liable for the liabilities of their firms, the 
interests of investors may conflict with the interests of their firms 
                                                            
46 Id. at 460 (discussing how secondary managers used value-at-risk to 
accomplish this). 
47 Id. at 465–69 (discussing possible solutions, including aligning com-
pensation incentives). 
48 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadows: Financial 
Disintermediation and the Need for a Common Language (Oct. 9, 2012) 
(unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2159455 
(explaining and developing the concept of responsibility failure). 
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and, more importantly for externalities, with the interests of third 
parties harmed by those firms.49 
 
 4. By facilitating decentralization, shadow banking makes 
this form of responsibility failure much more likely. The relatively 
small firms that operate in the disintermediated financial system are 
often managed directly by their primary investors. Because they 
typically divide up a significant share of the firm’s profits, those 
managers have strong incentives to take risks that could generate 
large profits. However, if a risky action exposes their firm to 
significant liability for externalized harm, those managers would not 
be liable if the firm cannot pay that liability. Such primary investor-
managers therefore have an incentive to take outsized risks with their 
firms, for the chance of outsized gains to themselves, 
notwithstanding the potential systemic impact that could result from 
their firm’s failure.50 
 
 5. This is radically unlike the management incentives in 
large firms, such as traditional banks, in which the senior managers 
tend to share only indirectly in profits, such as through stock options. 
These managers may also be more invested in maintaining their jobs 
and therefore are less motivated to take actions that increase risk to 




 In conclusion, the future of the real estate sector is integrally 
tied to the growth of shadow banking. Governments worldwide are 
struggling with innovative regulatory challenges, such as how to 
control possible excesses while preserving the benefits of mortgage-
loan origination and regeneration. No regulatory approach is likely to 
be perfect. 
                                                            
49 This is not an overlap with agency failure because agency failure goes to 
the principal-agent relationship whereas conflicts resulting from limited 
liability go to the conflict between managers of firms and society. 
50 To some extent this would be balanced, however, by the failure of a 
relatively small firm being less likely to trigger systemic consequences than 
the failure of a larger firm. 
